COMPETITION ACT AMENDMENTS 2026:TWO STEPS FORWARD, THREE STEPS BACK?
In July 2026,[1] the Dewan Negara passed the Competition (Amendment)
Bill 2026,[2] marking the most significant overhaul of the Competition Act
2010 (Act 712) since it came into force 14 years ago. For a regime that had
operated largely unchanged for more than a decade, this was the moment
to watch. It did not, however, deliver what many had been hoping for.
STEP FORWARD, HALF-TAKEN: NO MERGER CONTROL
Merger control refers to the procedure of reviewing mergers and
acquisitions under competition law. Its underlying objective is to prevent
the anti-competitive consequences of businesses merging with or acquiring
one another to create or strengthen a dominant position, which would
usually result in a significant impediment to effective competition.
Malaysia is not merely behind the curve on merger control; it is now the
only country in Southeast Asia without such a regime.[3] Even Timor-Leste,
ASEAN’s newest member, has gazetted a competition law incorporating a
mandatory merger control regime, which is due to come into force later this
year.[4] Despite being identified as a headline reform in the MyCC’s 2022
public consultation paper,[5] merger control does not feature in the 2026
amendments.
What Parliament passed instead is a set of procedural and enforcement
enhancements that, while useful, are narrower than the reform that had
actually been promised.
WHAT IS GENUINELY IMPROVED
To be fair to the Bill, some of its reforms are long overdue and positively
welcomed. The refinements to the investigation and enforcement
provisions provide greater clarity on the Commission’s powers. The
consolidation of the proposed decision and representation procedures under
section 36[6] also streamlines a previously fragmented process. Section
64A[7] introduces statutory informer protection, closing a gap in Malaysia’s
competition regime. The new right of appeal to the High Court from the
Competition Appeal Tribunal under section 58A,[8] confined to questions
of law, provides a sensible safeguard that did not previously exist.
These are steps forward. They are not, however, what this article is about.
THE BIGGEST CHANGE: CERTAIN VERTICAL AGREEMENTS
ARE NOW PRESUMED GUILTY TOO
The most significant change introduced by the Bill is the complete deletion
of the definitions of “horizontal agreement” and “vertical agreement” from
section 2.[9] As a result, the Act has been recast to refer simply to an
“agreement”, without expressly distinguishing between agreements
concluded between competitors and those concluded between noncompetitors.
This has a broader consequence for the Act as a whole, most
notably for section 4, which was the only provision that had distinguished
how the two types of agreement were assessed.
At first glance, this appears to bring the Act into closer alignment with the
legislative frameworks of the European Union (EU),[10] the United
Kingdom[11] and Singapore,[12] none of which expressly distinguish
between horizontal and vertical agreements in their respective statutory
prohibitions.
The distinction in those jurisdictions is instead addressed through
exemptions and guidelines, which provide businesses with greater clarity
as to how the respective prohibitions apply to different types of agreements.
Each of these jurisdictions prohibits agreements that have the object or
effect of restricting competition, and each lists categories of conduct, such
as price fixing, market sharing, fixing trading conditions, etc, as illustrative
examples of what may fall within that prohibition. This is language that
leaves the actual finding to be made on the facts, not assumed from the
category alone. None of them deems an agreement outright anticompetitive
simply because its terms match the list.
As such, the Bill’s intended alignment with those jurisdictions misses its
mark entirely. This is because section 4(2)[13] of the Malaysian Act contains
a feature for which there is no direct equivalent in the legislation of those
three jurisdictions: a deeming provision which treats an agreement as
automatically anti-competitive once its terms fall within one of the
specified categories. Once triggered, there is no requirement that the
agreement actually be shown to restrict competition. The Court of Appeal,
in the long-running dispute between MyCC and Malaysia Airlines and
AirAsia,[14] has already confirmed that this deeming provision, unlike an
ordinary presumption, is not rebuttable. Once an agreement falls within one
of the listed categories, its anti-competitive object is fixed by operation of
law, and this amendment leaves that provision firmly in place.
It is here, in this subtle but far-reaching shift, that the real difficulty lies.
Replicating the EU, UK and Singapore’s language by using the word
‘agreement’ does not replicate their substance; the problem was never the
word ‘agreement’, it was always a deeming provision now reaching
relationships it was never designed for.
The question is therefore not merely whether the horizontal and vertical
distinction should be removed, but whether it is coherent to do so while
retaining a deeming provision that may automatically characterise an
agreement as anti-competitive based solely on the nature of its terms.
Before this Bill, section 4(2) only applied this way to horizontal
agreements, between competitors. Vertical agreements, between non
competitors such as a supplier and a distributor, were assessed instead
under section 4(1)’s effects-based test, with MyCC’s own guidelines
setting a 25% market share safe harbour: where each party to a vertical
agreement holds less than 25% of their respective market, such agreements
are unlikely to cause a significant distortion to competition.
That distinction mattered, because not every section 4(2) category
translates cleanly onto a vertical relationship. Fixing trading conditions
between competitors is a reasonable proxy for collusion; there is rarely an
innocent reason for rivals to agree on terms. Fixing trading conditions
between a supplier and its distributor is not collusion; it is what every
supply agreement does. The same is true of limiting market access, an
everyday feature of exclusive distribution arrangements, not evidence of
anything untoward.
Take two ordinary vertical players, a manufacturer and a regional
distributor, each holding well under 10% of their respective markets, who
agree that the distributor will source exclusively from that manufacturer
within a defined territory. Previously, this agreement would have sat
comfortably within the safe harbour, and MyCC wouldn't even have looked
at it twice. Now it is automatically deemed anti-competitive regardless of
how negligible the parties’ market power actually is, and the safe harbour
simply does not apply once the deeming provision is triggered.
This is where the guidelines stop mattering. The role of legal advice is now
merely reduced to preparing a defence after the fact, since the assessment
stage is no longer relevant. The only way out is to be found liable first, and
then apply to be excused, arguing after the fact that the agreement’s
benefits justify what has already been deemed anti-competitive.[15] In other
words, the finding of guilt itself is never in question; only whether it can
be forgiven.
What comes as a surprise is that the single most consequential change to
how liability now attaches to vertical agreements under this Act arrived
without ever having been opened to public comment. MyCC’s 2022 public
consultation paper never flagged or signalled its intention to extend the
deeming provision’s reach, leaving many caught off guard by an
amendment they had no opportunity to respond to.
This is not a minor drafting inconsistency. It risks catching ordinary, procompetitive
commercial arrangements that pose no realistic threat to any
market.
MARKET REVIEW: BACKDOOR TO INVESTIGATION?
The amended Bill introduces a new section 11A[16] which empowers the
Commission to compel information, particulars or documents from any
person for the purpose of a market review, a study of a market’s structure
and conduct rather than an investigation into any specific enterprise.
A market review is prudential oversight in character, not an inquiry into
suspected wrongdoing, and it is not conditioned on any suspicion of
wrongdoing at all. Failing to comply with section 11A is itself an offence.
The provision looks harmless enough at first, until questions arise as to
how such information, confidential or not, is collected and used by the
Commission. If one compares this to another oversight power exercised for
a non-enforcement purpose, the new Statistics Bill 2026 contains a similar
power to allow the Department of Statistics to carry out its functions
properly. Introduced in the same legislative season, it still affords some
protection to information it compels: it cannot be used to determine a
person’s liability to any form of taxation or a levy.[17]
Section 11A of the Competition Act, however, offers no comparable
protection of any kind. The Competition Act’s own confidentiality
provision under section 21 looks, on its face, like it should fill that gap. It
does not.
Section 21(1)[18] applies to information obtained under any provision of the
Act, language broad enough to bring section 11A within its reach. Yet
section 21(2)(b),[19] unchanged by this Bill, expressly permits disclosure
wherever “necessary for the performance of the functions or powers of the
Commission.” That carve-out predates section 11A entirely and was never
designed with a power this broad in mind. It is nonetheless wide enough to
cover the Commission’s own subsequent use of the very information it can
now compel through non-investigative powers, since using it is, almost by
definition, the performance of the Commission’s functions. As to what kind
of material this exposes, section 21(3)[20] defines the protected information
as trade, business or industry information with commercial or economic
value that is not generally known, precisely the category of material now
well within section 11A’s reach.
It would appear that Parliament introduced a powerful new noninvestigative
compulsion power without ever revisiting whether the existing confidentiality regime could actually contain it.
The result is that a person can be compelled to hand over commercially
sensitive information for a study that is not even an investigation into them.
Nothing in the Act stops that same material resurfacing later, once the
Commission decides it is useful for a fuller investigation into the very
person who supplied it. What was collected under a power of oversight can
end up doing the work of an investigative one, without ever having to
survive the scrutiny an actual investigation would demand. Suffice to say,
an oversight power was never meant to double as a backdoor into
enforcement. Under the revised Competition Act, that door remains firmly
open.
THREE OFF-RAMPS, ALL AT THE COMMISSION’S DISCRETION
Start with the undertaking provision under section 43. In simple terms, an
undertaking is an agreement/commitment by an enterprise to the
Commission to either take specific actions and/or cease certain practices.
Before this Bill, if an undertaking was accepted by the Commission, it
would close the investigation without making any finding of infringement
and without imposing a penalty.[21] This was never a right an enterprise
could demand, as section 43 has always been entirely at the Commission’s
discretion. Parliament originally built the undertaking as a swift, lowfriction
way for the Commission to restore a market without needing to
conclude a full contested investigation, and there was no restriction on
when it could be accepted. It was, on its own terms, a well-designed
provision which rested on the assumption that the Commission did not
collect penalties as a source of revenue.
Under the amended section 43,[22] the undertaking can now only be
accepted at a defined point, after an investigation has commenced, but
before a proposed decision is issued, and the Commission may condition
its acceptance on payment of a fine at a rate it determines. In simpler terms,
the amended section 43 now empowers the Commission to monetise what
was once, by design, a penalty-free provision.
Section 16(3)[23] is new. It allows the Commission, where it has decided
not to investigate a matter further, to issue a warning letter instead,
intended to prevent an infringement before one has fully materialised,
without triggering the fuller investigative and enforcement process.
Section 38A[24] is also new. It introduces a settlement procedure available
after the Commission has issued a proposed decision. An enterprise that
settles can receive a reduction of up to 40% on its eventual penalty, but
only if it admits liability for the infringement being investigated. That
admission is what exposes the enterprise to a private right of action from
any third party who suffered loss as a result.
At first glance, all three of these appear to be welcome, practical additions
to the Commission’s toolkit, early off-ramps that allow matters to resolve
without a full contested process. Section 38A is the obvious exception:
requiring an admission of guilt as the price of a discount sits uneasily with
how settlement is meant to work, and it is the one of the three that carries
a real, identifiable cost for the enterprise even where it cooperates.
But look at where all three provisions actually sit: squarely on the
Commission’s side of the court. The Commission “may” issue a warning.
The Commission “may” not only accept an undertaking, but it has the
power to monetise it. The Commission “may” offer a settlement, and for
settlement, the enterprise cannot even ask for one; only the Commission
can put it on the table.
But in whose interest is that discretion likely to be exercised?
A STRUCTURE WORTH EXPLAINING
MyCC currently operates on the assumption that it is entitled to collect the
financial penalties it imposes as revenue for itself. That assumption has
never rested on an explicit statutory grant, and it still doesn’t. The recent
amendments to the Competition Commission Act 2010 (Act 713) give
MyCC clearer authority to impose financial penalties and late payment
charges, but nowhere do they grant it the authority to retain those penalties
as its own revenue.[25]
Yet, MyCC’s latest publicly accessible annual report dates back to 2023,
where it recorded RM11.8 million in financial penalties as a source of
revenue for the Commission, a sharp increase from the RM352,000
recorded the year before.[26] The classification of these penalties as revenue
is MyCC’s own,[27] not a characterisation imposed on it from outside. But
whether or not that authority is ever made explicit, the underlying principle
should not depend on it: no public authority ought to be financially
benefiting from the penalties it hands down.
Penalties are meant to be corrective, not a funding source.[28] That is why
penalties collected by the competition regulator in Singapore and the UK
are remitted directly to their nation’s Consolidated Fund.[29] This removes
any question of the regulator having a stake in the size of its own fines.
Collecting penalties as revenue creates a structural risk of financial bias
regardless of the legal basis for it, and that risk is not hypothetical here.
That context matters, because three of the 2026 amendments – a warning
power, an undertaking, and a settlement mechanism – all sit at the
Commission’s discretion. That discretion is exercised by a body that, as
established above, has already shown it treats the penalties it imposes as its
own revenue. Given that the Commission stands to gain financially from
the harsher outcome in each case, there is a real question of whether these
provisions will be exercised as generously as they appear on paper. An
enterprise seeking the lenient route may simply find the Commission
declining to offer it, in favour of the fuller investigation and the larger fine
that follows.
It is not hard to see where this leads. An enterprise denied a warning, an
undertaking, or a settlement, and instead forced into a fuller and costlier
process, is left with an obvious argument: that the refusal may be tainted
by the Commission’s own financial stake in the outcome.
That argument rests on one of the oldest principles in administrative law:
a decision maker with a personal or financial interest in the result should
not be the one making it. Whether such a challenge succeeds will turn on
the facts of each case. But the more visible the Commission’s revenue
interest becomes, the more often it is likely to be raised. And every exercise
of discretion under these provisions is likely to attract more scrutiny as a
result.
WHERE THAT LEAVES THE ACT
The refinements in this Bill are, on their own, most welcome, but none of
them addresses the conflict sitting underneath everything else raised here:
a regulator that continues to treat the penalties it imposes as its own
revenue. Remove that conflict, and the concern running through the
Commission’s discretion over warnings, undertakings and settlements falls
away on its own.
Discretion becomes simply discretion, exercised on its merits, with far less
room for an enterprise to argue it was exercised otherwise. That outcome
is as much in the Commission’s own interest as anyone else’s.
Left unaddressed, however, the pattern across these amendments is hard to
ignore: a deeming provision now extended to vertical agreements, bringing
more cases within enforcement reach, a market review power that has
become a back door into enforcement before any investigation has even
begun, and three enforcement off ramps that all sit at the discretion of a
body with every reason to prefer the costlier outcome.
None of this proves the amendments were built with that motive in mind.
But an expanded net, cast by a party with a financial stake in what it
catches, invites the question regardless. Two steps forward. Three steps
back.
*Suren Rajah is a practising lawyer at Messrs Rajah Chambers. The views expressed
above are entirely his own. This article has been publiched in the Current Law Journal (CLJ) - [2026] CLJU(A) lxxx1v
Endnotes:
[1] ‘Senate Passes Competition Bill to Strengthen Fight Against Cartels, Monopolies’,
Bernama (online, 27 July 2026) <https://bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2586596>.
[2] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026 (DR 12/2026).
[3] Choy Nyen Yiau, ‘Merger control bill to be tabled next parliamentary session, says
domestic trade minister’, The Edge Malaysia (online, 12 November 2024)
<https://theedgemalaysia.com/node/733660>.
[4] ‘Legal Alert: New Competition Law in Timor Leste’ (Morais Leitao, 10 April 2026)
Law-in-Timor-Leste/26761/>.
[5] ‘Salient Points of the Proposed Amendments to the Competition Act 2010 (Act 712)’
(Malaysia Competition Commission (MyCC), 25 April 2022)
[2026] CLJU(A) lxxxiv 11
oposed%20Amendments%20of%20Act%20712%20%5B25.4.22%5D.pdf>.
[6] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026, cl. 17.
[7] Ibid, cl. 30.
[8] Ibid, cl. 29.
[9] Ibid, cl. 2.
[10] Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), art. 101.
[11] Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Act 2024 (UK), s. 119(2).
[12] Competition Act 2004 (Singapore), s. 34.
[14] Malaysia Airline System Bhd v. Competition Commission & Another Appeal [2022]
1 CLJ 856.
[15] Competition Act 2010, s. 5.
[16] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026, cl. 7.
[17] Statistics Bill 2026, s. 14(2).
[18] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026, cl. 11.
[19] Competition Act 2010, s. 21(2)(b).
[20] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026, cl. 11.
[21] Competition Act 2010, s. 43.
[22] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026, cl. 25.
[23] Ibid, cl. 8.
[24] Ibid, cl. 20.
[25] Competition Commission (Amendment) Bill 2026 (DR 11/2026).
[2026] CLJU(A) lxxxiv 12
[26] MyCC’s 2023 Annual Report (Malaysia Competition Commission, 2023) 1–96, 72.
[27] Ibid, 77.
[28] Suren Rajah, ‘Potential Challenges Looming for These Regulatory Bodies’ [2025]
CLJU(A) xxxii.
[29] See section 13(2) of the Singapore’s Competition Act 2004 and section 36(9) of
the UK’s Competition Act 1998.

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