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COMPETITION ACT AMENDMENTS 2026:TWO STEPS FORWARD, THREE STEPS BACK?

Sep 14
12 min read

In July 2026,[1] the Dewan Negara passed the Competition (Amendment)

Bill 2026,[2] marking the most significant overhaul of the Competition Act

2010 (Act 712) since it came into force 14 years ago. For a regime that had

operated largely unchanged for more than a decade, this was the moment

to watch. It did not, however, deliver what many had been hoping for.


STEP FORWARD, HALF-TAKEN: NO MERGER CONTROL


Merger control refers to the procedure of reviewing mergers and

acquisitions under competition law. Its underlying objective is to prevent

the anti-competitive consequences of businesses merging with or acquiring

one another to create or strengthen a dominant position, which would

usually result in a significant impediment to effective competition.

Malaysia is not merely behind the curve on merger control; it is now the

only country in Southeast Asia without such a regime.[3] Even Timor-Leste,

ASEAN’s newest member, has gazetted a competition law incorporating a

mandatory merger control regime, which is due to come into force later this

year.[4] Despite being identified as a headline reform in the MyCC’s 2022

public consultation paper,[5] merger control does not feature in the 2026

amendments.


What Parliament passed instead is a set of procedural and enforcement

enhancements that, while useful, are narrower than the reform that had

actually been promised.


WHAT IS GENUINELY IMPROVED


To be fair to the Bill, some of its reforms are long overdue and positively

welcomed. The refinements to the investigation and enforcement

provisions provide greater clarity on the Commission’s powers. The

consolidation of the proposed decision and representation procedures under

section 36[6] also streamlines a previously fragmented process. Section

64A[7] introduces statutory informer protection, closing a gap in Malaysia’s

competition regime. The new right of appeal to the High Court from the

Competition Appeal Tribunal under section 58A,[8] confined to questions

of law, provides a sensible safeguard that did not previously exist.


These are steps forward. They are not, however, what this article is about.


THE BIGGEST CHANGE: CERTAIN VERTICAL AGREEMENTS

ARE NOW PRESUMED GUILTY TOO


The most significant change introduced by the Bill is the complete deletion

of the definitions of “horizontal agreement” and “vertical agreement” from

section 2.[9] As a result, the Act has been recast to refer simply to an

“agreement”, without expressly distinguishing between agreements

concluded between competitors and those concluded between noncompetitors.

This has a broader consequence for the Act as a whole, most

notably for section 4, which was the only provision that had distinguished

how the two types of agreement were assessed.


At first glance, this appears to bring the Act into closer alignment with the

legislative frameworks of the European Union (EU),[10] the United

Kingdom[11] and Singapore,[12] none of which expressly distinguish

between horizontal and vertical agreements in their respective statutory

prohibitions.


The distinction in those jurisdictions is instead addressed through

exemptions and guidelines, which provide businesses with greater clarity

as to how the respective prohibitions apply to different types of agreements.


Each of these jurisdictions prohibits agreements that have the object or

effect of restricting competition, and each lists categories of conduct, such

as price fixing, market sharing, fixing trading conditions, etc, as illustrative

examples of what may fall within that prohibition. This is language that

leaves the actual finding to be made on the facts, not assumed from the

category alone. None of them deems an agreement outright anticompetitive

simply because its terms match the list.


As such, the Bill’s intended alignment with those jurisdictions misses its

mark entirely. This is because section 4(2)[13] of the Malaysian Act contains

a feature for which there is no direct equivalent in the legislation of those

three jurisdictions: a deeming provision which treats an agreement as

automatically anti-competitive once its terms fall within one of the

specified categories. Once triggered, there is no requirement that the

agreement actually be shown to restrict competition. The Court of Appeal,

in the long-running dispute between MyCC and Malaysia Airlines and

AirAsia,[14] has already confirmed that this deeming provision, unlike an

ordinary presumption, is not rebuttable. Once an agreement falls within one

of the listed categories, its anti-competitive object is fixed by operation of

law, and this amendment leaves that provision firmly in place.


It is here, in this subtle but far-reaching shift, that the real difficulty lies.

Replicating the EU, UK and Singapore’s language by using the word

‘agreement’ does not replicate their substance; the problem was never the

word ‘agreement’, it was always a deeming provision now reaching

relationships it was never designed for.


The question is therefore not merely whether the horizontal and vertical

distinction should be removed, but whether it is coherent to do so while

retaining a deeming provision that may automatically characterise an

agreement as anti-competitive based solely on the nature of its terms.

Before this Bill, section 4(2) only applied this way to horizontal

agreements, between competitors. Vertical agreements, between non

competitors such as a supplier and a distributor, were assessed instead

under section 4(1)’s effects-based test, with MyCC’s own guidelines

setting a 25% market share safe harbour: where each party to a vertical

agreement holds less than 25% of their respective market, such agreements

are unlikely to cause a significant distortion to competition.


That distinction mattered, because not every section 4(2) category

translates cleanly onto a vertical relationship. Fixing trading conditions

between competitors is a reasonable proxy for collusion; there is rarely an

innocent reason for rivals to agree on terms. Fixing trading conditions

between a supplier and its distributor is not collusion; it is what every

supply agreement does. The same is true of limiting market access, an

everyday feature of exclusive distribution arrangements, not evidence of

anything untoward.


Take two ordinary vertical players, a manufacturer and a regional

distributor, each holding well under 10% of their respective markets, who

agree that the distributor will source exclusively from that manufacturer

within a defined territory. Previously, this agreement would have sat

comfortably within the safe harbour, and MyCC wouldn't even have looked

at it twice. Now it is automatically deemed anti-competitive regardless of

how negligible the parties’ market power actually is, and the safe harbour

simply does not apply once the deeming provision is triggered.


This is where the guidelines stop mattering. The role of legal advice is now

merely reduced to preparing a defence after the fact, since the assessment

stage is no longer relevant. The only way out is to be found liable first, and

then apply to be excused, arguing after the fact that the agreement’s

benefits justify what has already been deemed anti-competitive.[15] In other

words, the finding of guilt itself is never in question; only whether it can

be forgiven.


What comes as a surprise is that the single most consequential change to

how liability now attaches to vertical agreements under this Act arrived

without ever having been opened to public comment. MyCC’s 2022 public

consultation paper never flagged or signalled its intention to extend the

deeming provision’s reach, leaving many caught off guard by an

amendment they had no opportunity to respond to.


This is not a minor drafting inconsistency. It risks catching ordinary, procompetitive

commercial arrangements that pose no realistic threat to any

market.


MARKET REVIEW: BACKDOOR TO INVESTIGATION?


The amended Bill introduces a new section 11A[16] which empowers the

Commission to compel information, particulars or documents from any

person for the purpose of a market review, a study of a market’s structure

and conduct rather than an investigation into any specific enterprise.

A market review is prudential oversight in character, not an inquiry into

suspected wrongdoing, and it is not conditioned on any suspicion of

wrongdoing at all. Failing to comply with section 11A is itself an offence.

The provision looks harmless enough at first, until questions arise as to

how such information, confidential or not, is collected and used by the

Commission. If one compares this to another oversight power exercised for

a non-enforcement purpose, the new Statistics Bill 2026 contains a similar

power to allow the Department of Statistics to carry out its functions

properly. Introduced in the same legislative season, it still affords some

protection to information it compels: it cannot be used to determine a

person’s liability to any form of taxation or a levy.[17]


Section 11A of the Competition Act, however, offers no comparable

protection of any kind. The Competition Act’s own confidentiality

provision under section 21 looks, on its face, like it should fill that gap. It

does not.


Section 21(1)[18] applies to information obtained under any provision of the

Act, language broad enough to bring section 11A within its reach. Yet

section 21(2)(b),[19] unchanged by this Bill, expressly permits disclosure

wherever “necessary for the performance of the functions or powers of the

Commission.” That carve-out predates section 11A entirely and was never

designed with a power this broad in mind. It is nonetheless wide enough to

cover the Commission’s own subsequent use of the very information it can

now compel through non-investigative powers, since using it is, almost by

definition, the performance of the Commission’s functions. As to what kind

of material this exposes, section 21(3)[20] defines the protected information

as trade, business or industry information with commercial or economic

value that is not generally known, precisely the category of material now

well within section 11A’s reach.


It would appear that Parliament introduced a powerful new noninvestigative

compulsion power without ever revisiting whether the existing confidentiality regime could actually contain it.


The result is that a person can be compelled to hand over commercially

sensitive information for a study that is not even an investigation into them.

Nothing in the Act stops that same material resurfacing later, once the

Commission decides it is useful for a fuller investigation into the very

person who supplied it. What was collected under a power of oversight can

end up doing the work of an investigative one, without ever having to

survive the scrutiny an actual investigation would demand. Suffice to say,

an oversight power was never meant to double as a backdoor into

enforcement. Under the revised Competition Act, that door remains firmly

open.


THREE OFF-RAMPS, ALL AT THE COMMISSION’S DISCRETION


Start with the undertaking provision under section 43. In simple terms, an

undertaking is an agreement/commitment by an enterprise to the

Commission to either take specific actions and/or cease certain practices.

Before this Bill, if an undertaking was accepted by the Commission, it

would close the investigation without making any finding of infringement

and without imposing a penalty.[21] This was never a right an enterprise

could demand, as section 43 has always been entirely at the Commission’s

discretion. Parliament originally built the undertaking as a swift, lowfriction

way for the Commission to restore a market without needing to

conclude a full contested investigation, and there was no restriction on

when it could be accepted. It was, on its own terms, a well-designed

provision which rested on the assumption that the Commission did not

collect penalties as a source of revenue.


Under the amended section 43,[22] the undertaking can now only be

accepted at a defined point, after an investigation has commenced, but

before a proposed decision is issued, and the Commission may condition

its acceptance on payment of a fine at a rate it determines. In simpler terms,

the amended section 43 now empowers the Commission to monetise what

was once, by design, a penalty-free provision.


Section 16(3)[23] is new. It allows the Commission, where it has decided

not to investigate a matter further, to issue a warning letter instead,

intended to prevent an infringement before one has fully materialised,

without triggering the fuller investigative and enforcement process.

Section 38A[24] is also new. It introduces a settlement procedure available

after the Commission has issued a proposed decision. An enterprise that

settles can receive a reduction of up to 40% on its eventual penalty, but

only if it admits liability for the infringement being investigated. That

admission is what exposes the enterprise to a private right of action from

any third party who suffered loss as a result.


At first glance, all three of these appear to be welcome, practical additions

to the Commission’s toolkit, early off-ramps that allow matters to resolve

without a full contested process. Section 38A is the obvious exception:

requiring an admission of guilt as the price of a discount sits uneasily with

how settlement is meant to work, and it is the one of the three that carries

a real, identifiable cost for the enterprise even where it cooperates.


But look at where all three provisions actually sit: squarely on the

Commission’s side of the court. The Commission “may” issue a warning.

The Commission “may” not only accept an undertaking, but it has the

power to monetise it. The Commission “may” offer a settlement, and for

settlement, the enterprise cannot even ask for one; only the Commission

can put it on the table.


But in whose interest is that discretion likely to be exercised?


A STRUCTURE WORTH EXPLAINING


MyCC currently operates on the assumption that it is entitled to collect the

financial penalties it imposes as revenue for itself. That assumption has

never rested on an explicit statutory grant, and it still doesn’t. The recent

amendments to the Competition Commission Act 2010 (Act 713) give

MyCC clearer authority to impose financial penalties and late payment

charges, but nowhere do they grant it the authority to retain those penalties

as its own revenue.[25]


Yet, MyCC’s latest publicly accessible annual report dates back to 2023,

where it recorded RM11.8 million in financial penalties as a source of

revenue for the Commission, a sharp increase from the RM352,000

recorded the year before.[26] The classification of these penalties as revenue

is MyCC’s own,[27] not a characterisation imposed on it from outside. But

whether or not that authority is ever made explicit, the underlying principle

should not depend on it: no public authority ought to be financially

benefiting from the penalties it hands down.


Penalties are meant to be corrective, not a funding source.[28] That is why

penalties collected by the competition regulator in Singapore and the UK

are remitted directly to their nation’s Consolidated Fund.[29] This removes

any question of the regulator having a stake in the size of its own fines.

Collecting penalties as revenue creates a structural risk of financial bias

regardless of the legal basis for it, and that risk is not hypothetical here.


That context matters, because three of the 2026 amendments – a warning

power, an undertaking, and a settlement mechanism – all sit at the

Commission’s discretion. That discretion is exercised by a body that, as

established above, has already shown it treats the penalties it imposes as its

own revenue. Given that the Commission stands to gain financially from

the harsher outcome in each case, there is a real question of whether these

provisions will be exercised as generously as they appear on paper. An

enterprise seeking the lenient route may simply find the Commission

declining to offer it, in favour of the fuller investigation and the larger fine

that follows.


It is not hard to see where this leads. An enterprise denied a warning, an

undertaking, or a settlement, and instead forced into a fuller and costlier

process, is left with an obvious argument: that the refusal may be tainted

by the Commission’s own financial stake in the outcome.


That argument rests on one of the oldest principles in administrative law:

a decision maker with a personal or financial interest in the result should

not be the one making it. Whether such a challenge succeeds will turn on

the facts of each case. But the more visible the Commission’s revenue

interest becomes, the more often it is likely to be raised. And every exercise

of discretion under these provisions is likely to attract more scrutiny as a

result.


WHERE THAT LEAVES THE ACT


The refinements in this Bill are, on their own, most welcome, but none of

them addresses the conflict sitting underneath everything else raised here:

a regulator that continues to treat the penalties it imposes as its own

revenue. Remove that conflict, and the concern running through the

Commission’s discretion over warnings, undertakings and settlements falls

away on its own.


Discretion becomes simply discretion, exercised on its merits, with far less

room for an enterprise to argue it was exercised otherwise. That outcome

is as much in the Commission’s own interest as anyone else’s.


Left unaddressed, however, the pattern across these amendments is hard to

ignore: a deeming provision now extended to vertical agreements, bringing

more cases within enforcement reach, a market review power that has

become a back door into enforcement before any investigation has even

begun, and three enforcement off ramps that all sit at the discretion of a

body with every reason to prefer the costlier outcome.


None of this proves the amendments were built with that motive in mind.

But an expanded net, cast by a party with a financial stake in what it

catches, invites the question regardless. Two steps forward. Three steps

back.


*Suren Rajah is a practising lawyer at Messrs Rajah Chambers. The views expressed

above are entirely his own. This article has been publiched in the Current Law Journal (CLJ) - [2026] CLJU(A) lxxx1v


Endnotes:

[1] ‘Senate Passes Competition Bill to Strengthen Fight Against Cartels, Monopolies’,

Bernama (online, 27 July 2026) <https://bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2586596>.

[2] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026 (DR 12/2026).

[3] Choy Nyen Yiau, ‘Merger control bill to be tabled next parliamentary session, says

domestic trade minister’, The Edge Malaysia (online, 12 November 2024)

<https://theedgemalaysia.com/node/733660>.

[4] ‘Legal Alert: New Competition Law in Timor Leste’ (Morais Leitao, 10 April 2026)

Law-in-Timor-Leste/26761/>.

[5] ‘Salient Points of the Proposed Amendments to the Competition Act 2010 (Act 712)’

(Malaysia Competition Commission (MyCC), 25 April 2022)

[2026] CLJU(A) lxxxiv 11

oposed%20Amendments%20of%20Act%20712%20%5B25.4.22%5D.pdf>.

[6] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026, cl. 17.

[7] Ibid, cl. 30.

[8] Ibid, cl. 29.

[9] Ibid, cl. 2.

[10] Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), art. 101.

[11] Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Act 2024 (UK), s. 119(2).

[12] Competition Act 2004 (Singapore), s. 34.

[14] Malaysia Airline System Bhd v. Competition Commission & Another Appeal [2022]

1 CLJ 856.

[15] Competition Act 2010, s. 5.

[16] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026, cl. 7.

[17] Statistics Bill 2026, s. 14(2).

[18] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026, cl. 11.

[19] Competition Act 2010, s. 21(2)(b).

[20] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026, cl. 11.

[21] Competition Act 2010, s. 43.

[22] Competition (Amendment) Bill 2026, cl. 25.

[23] Ibid, cl. 8.

[24] Ibid, cl. 20.

[25] Competition Commission (Amendment) Bill 2026 (DR 11/2026).

[2026] CLJU(A) lxxxiv 12

[26] MyCC’s 2023 Annual Report (Malaysia Competition Commission, 2023) 1–96, 72.

[27] Ibid, 77.

[28] Suren Rajah, ‘Potential Challenges Looming for These Regulatory Bodies’ [2025]

CLJU(A) xxxii.

[29] See section 13(2) of the Singapore’s Competition Act 2004 and section 36(9) of

the UK’s Competition Act 1998.

 
 
 

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